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Introduction 
In recent years major employers across the European Union have sought greater 
scope to negotiate working and employment practices specific to the circumstances 
of the company or its constituent units (Ferner and Hyman, 1998). Closer economic 
integration, notably through economic and monetary union (EMU), has opened na-
tional product and financial markets and facilitated a breathtaking pace of domestic 
and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In these circumstances, multi-employer 
bargaining at national sector level appears increasingly anomalous. In internationally 
competitive sectors such as metalworking, multi-employer bargaining can no longer 
realistically insure employers against the effects of increased costs due to collective 
bargaining. Even in sectors that remain largely domestic, such as retail banking, em-
ployers have used international competitiveness criteria to facilitate industry restruc-
turing and greater variability at company level in the wake of national de-regulation 
(Regini et al, 1999). Yet, with the notable exception of the UK, where there has been 
a significant shift to single-employer bargaining, sector-wide multi-employer bar-
gaining continues to be important within the confines of national boundaries, with 
many large companies, including multinational companies (MNCs), remaining com-
mitted players.  
This article examines the changing balance between multi-employer and single-
employer bargaining in large firms. The analysis focuses on developments across 
two distinct but related dimensions: externalisation-internalisation and centralisa-
tion-decentralisation. In the first instance, the focus is on the degree of externalisa-
tion, i.e. the nature and extent of the engagement with sectoral multi-employer bar-
gaining (MEB). In the second it is on the level of internalisation within the company, 
i.e. the competing tendencies in business and collective bargaining structures be-
tween heteronomy (centralisation at group or company level) and autonomy (local-
isation at division or business unit level) within the organisation. The treatment is 
comparative, analysing developments in two important sectors, metalworking and 
banking, which operate in different types of markets. Six case studies from three 
countries (Belgium, Germany and Italy) are used to explore the changing relationship 
of large companies to the sector arrangements; two more cases from Britain are 
added to inform discussion of the re-organisation of collective bargaining within the 
firm. 
The results demonstrate that developments that are often labelled indiscrimi-
nately as decentralisation takes various forms, within and without the company, and 
that these are re-shaping the relationship between sector and company in different 
ways. Furthermore, sector features are at least as significant as country factors in ex-
plaining change. Across the different countries, internalisation tendencies appear 
strongest in banking and decentralisation within the firm is more a feature of metal-
working. This is explained in terms of transaction costs and power relations. Trans-
action costs refer to the efficiency factors, usually a function of heterogeneity and 
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scale, which bear on the external and internal location of collective bargaining. Po-
wer relations refer to the conditions for collective bargaining, which reflect the struc-
ture of the sector, the performance of the firm, trade union organisation, and the 
national political and legal context. These factors are important in shaping the path 
dependencies that have encouraged not deregulation but organised forms of decen-
tralisation from sector to company level in different countries (Traxler 1995). How-
ever the re-formation of sectoral MEB reflects changes in power relations and trans-
action costs that are peculiar to the industry as well as the national context, and 
therefore to some degree generalisable across national borders.  
The next section elaborates our theoretical and research approach, followed by a 
brief exposition of methods. Part II sets out the results in terms of developments in, 
first, externalisation and second decentralisation. Part III discusses the findings in the 
light of our transaction costs and power relations approach, and Part IV deals with 
the wider conclusions and implications. 
1. Analytical Framework 
Efficiency, power and politics  
Commons was one of the first observers to note that MEB is not solely a defen-
sive activity in the face of strong trade unions. Rather, the extension of markets and 
the menace of competition was the driving force behind the transformation of mer-
chants associations striving to hold up prices into employers associations endeav-
ouring to restrict both wage growth and the under-cutting of the marginal producer 
(Commons 1909: 78). As Pierson (1961: 39) succinctly put it, employer solidarity in 
the industrial relations field long antedates labour solidarity. Nevertheless, once 
trade unions entered the equation, MEB had a certain logic for both parties (Sisson 
1987; Traxler et al. 2001). For employers, it pooled their strength vis-a-vis organised 
labour and limited the danger of leapfrogging should they risk to go it alone. Exter-
nalising the bargaining process brought transaction cost savings, directly in terms of 
management time and resources, and indirectly by shifting the focus of conflict away 
from the individual workplace and enterprise. Instead, some stability was ensured by 
the legitimacy that comes with consistency of treatment. The universalisation of 
standard terms and condition across the sector also appealed to trade unions, as did 
the opportunity to husband scarce resources by focusing on a single set of negotia-
tions. Last but not least, MEB was also favoured by the state as a means of institu-
tionalising and containing industrial conflict, along with delivering other key policy 
goals, ranging from employment regulation to price control. The state played a par-
ticularly important role in the historical emergence of MEB, including in the UK 
where early industrialisation predisposed employers to market-based approaches 
(Gospel 1992). 
Nonetheless, a dominant trend in collective bargaining in western Europe over 
the last twenty years has been decentralisation from sector to company level. This 
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process has been managed in most EEA countries, the UK apart, largely within the 
framework of continued sector agreements, often sustained in part by national con-
certation pressures in the context of EMU convergence (Traxler et al. 2001; Ferner/ 
Hyman 1998). It has nonetheless taken various forms, which is all too often ignored. 
The main contrast is between authorised and unauthorised decentralisation. In the 
former, the relationship between sector and company is readjusted. This can be gen-
eral in scope, whereby the sector takes the form of a softer framework to allow 
more autonomy for second-tier bargaining. The Italian banking sector is one exam-
ple. Or it can more particularly take the form of special exemptions or opening 
clauses to the otherwise robust sector agreement, including for companies in hard-
ship or restructuring, such as in German metalworking. Unauthorised decentralisa-
tion occurs when company bargaining contradicts and/or extends beyond the remit 
laid down in the sector agreement.  Especially important are new activities such as 
direct banking and, in metalworking, information and communication technology 
(ICT) operations that fall outside the traditional sector boundaries. The sector agree-
ment might not then cover all the activities of the firm. Decentralisation to com-
pany level can therefore reflect different trajectories to do with the changing form 
of the sector agreement, its reach and relationship to the company, tendencies that 
we explore more fully in the next section. 
Large multi-national companies (MNCs) have led the way in many ways (Margin-
son and Sisson 1996). The size of these firms lends them enormous influence in the sec-
tor, but increased internationalisation and diversification has loosened their ties to na-
tional sector arrangements. This is not just because of the opening of markets, the threat 
of regime shopping and prospects of capital flight. Reorganisation based on pan-
European product or business streams, together with the devolution of management con-
trol to divisional and business unit level, has weakened the national sector as the natural 
benchmark for collective bargaining. Instead, bottom-line responsibility of individual 
business units and cross-border comparisons of best practice have become increasingly 
important, not least because of the accelerated pace of change resulting from increased 
competition and market uncertainty (Sisson/Arrowsmith/Marginson 2003). National sec-
tor MEB cannot deal with the same level of detail required to bring about change, nor 
can it carry the same weight as the coercive comparisons made internally within the 
firm. Internationalisation therefore increases the bargaining power of management, at a 
time when many unions are already suffering membership decline, further undermining 
one of the major rationales for MEB. 
The wider impact of MNCs in undermining MEB is also significant. MNCs 
have very often been willing and able to trade-off improvements in substantive terms 
and conditions in return for concessions in employment and working practices in or-
der to enhance productivity and adaptiveness to changing conditions. Smaller com-
panies, on the other hand, have less incentive, and fewer resources, to engage in such 
quid-pro-quo bargaining, leading to their growing disillusionment with and, in some 
cases, withdrawal from membership of their employers organizations. The actions of 
large companies therefore impinge on MEB in indirect as well as direct ways. 
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The rise and, potentially, incipient demise of sectoral MEB therefore centres in 
important respects on the actions of MNCs. Indeed, changing sector-firm relations 
can be analysed in terms of internalisation versus externalisation pressures within 
these large firms. Transaction costs analysis predicts that increased scale, especially 
in integrated and standardised (Fordist) systems, leads to pressures for internalisa-
tion in order to control environmental uncertainty more efficiently (Coase 1937; 
Chandler 1977; Williamson 1975, 1985). Power considerations are also relevant in 
that large companies may be better placed to resist union demands because of their 
labour market presence, or to accommodate them because of the scope for redistribu-
tive bargaining that derives from lower unit costs (Levinson 1966; Ulman 1974). 
Power and transaction cost factors also explain the circumstances under which large 
firms willingly externalise collective bargaining, either because unions attain an un-
usual degree of power (Pierson 1950: 358), or because it is more efficient to con-
front rationalisation and restructuring through co-ordinated means rather than inde-
pendently (Kenis 1992). The internationalisation of markets and firms, and diversifi-
cation of business activities, undermines national sector MEB on both counts. 
Transaction costs and power factors also help explain the degree of centralisa-
tion or decentralisation of collective bargaining within the firm, and changes therein. 
For example, product homogeneity, market stability and a strong trade union might 
make centralised bargaining appealing for employers on grounds of minimising 
transaction costs and maximising bargaining power at the organisational level, 
particularly if the sector sets a strong prior framework. Conversely, diverse activities 
and a rapid pace of change makes local bargaining more attractive, especially if trade 
unions are weak.  
In each case the approach of the state is also vital. In Sweden, for example, 
Thornqvist (1999: 80) sees political and ideological changes as without doubt of the 
utmost importance for understanding the decentralization process. Here, decentrali-
sation was less a response to wage drift or about facilitating greater flexibility in the 
organisation of work, than a manifestation of increased employer militancy following 
the extension of worker rights and industrial conflict of the 1970s. Political consid-
erations have also been responsible for some re-centralisation in recent years as the 
Swedish state has sought to limit the pattern bargaining and leapfrogging associated 
with the shift from inter-sector bargaining as part of its anti-inflationary goals (Kjell-
berg 1998). The state has had an even more prominent role in supporting MEB in 
Belgium (Deneyer/Tollet 2002). In the UK, by way of contrast, Conservative admini-
strations of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged employers to view multi-employer bar-
gaining as an abdication of managerial responsibility; they also introduced a series of 
measures aimed at weakening further its capacity to comprehensively regulate the la-
bour market (Clark 2000). 
From this brief discussion, the relevant variables for our analysis are set out 
(Table 1). Transaction costs refer to the determinants of the most efficient level of 
bargaining whether outside the firm, at central level within the firm, or locally. These 
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are essentially a function of the scale, stability and integrity of market and firm 
boundaries. Especially important is heterogeneity of activities (Schmitt/Sadowski 
2001). Across companies, greater heterogeneity of activities weakens common inter-
ests and makes even tacit collusion between employers more difficult. Within the 
company, heterogeneity of activities reduces the economies of scale that can be de-
rived from a standard approach. Transaction cost factors also have a bearing on 
power relations. For example, intensive competition, which increases uncertainty and 
instability and acts as a pressure for localisation in transaction-costs terms, also 
strengthens managements control of the bargaining agenda. Likewise, the interna-
tionalisation of business activities reduces the relevance and therefore the transac-
tion-cost savings that can be derived from externalising to the sector; it may also in-
crease managements power to divide and rule trade unions within an internation-
ally competitive internal investment market. On the other hand, high capital inten-
sity, which increases the scale of production and might therefore encourage central-
ised industrial relations, also increases the disruptive capacity of organised labour. 
These power factors are more explicitly considered in terms of firm and trade union 
strength variables in the second and third rows of the table. The level of concentra-
tion, competition and diversity of activities influences the interest and capacity of 
employers to control labour costs and enter into forms of collusion. The strength of 
Table 1.  Transaction costs, power and context factors in internalisation and decentralisation 
Transaction cost 
factors 
Heterogeneity of activities  
Internationalisation of operations 
Capital/ labour intensity 
Technological change  
Extendedisation (outsourcing, business units) 
Power factors: 
Firm organisa-
tion 
Product homogeneity 
Industrial concentration 
Competition  
Internationalisation 
Power factors: 
Trade union 
strength 
Status factors (membership density; legal rights) 
Mobilisation factors (leadership; member militancy; unity and rivalry) 
Context factors (labour market; skills; work organisation; firm profitabil-
ity) 
Power factors: 
Political and in-
stitutional con-
text 
Historic role of employer association and unions 
History and ownership of the firm 
Government ideology and policy 
Employment law 
Economic conditions (inflation, unemployment) 
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trade unions at different levels makes employers more or less vulnerable to going it 
alone and unions more or less concerned to extend protection to areas that may be 
less well organised. The fourth set of factors refers to the broader economic, political 
and historical context that helps shape, or break, path dependency. 
These variables represent the broad historical and institutional contexts within 
which decision making and collective bargaining is played out at firm level, subject 
to the dynamic effects of changing economic, technological and political conditions. 
It is not possible within the confines of the present paper to map in detail the constel-
lation of structural and organisational factors that has reshaped the bargaining arena 
and agenda of the eight case study firms. Rather, our concern is to identify relevant 
analytical tools and themes underpinning decentralisation and subject them to em-
pirical test, if at the cost of some comprehensiveness of scope in terms of the sets of 
factors identified in Table 1. Of necessity, we focus on transaction costs and the mi-
cro-politics of power relations that face the firm, without operationalising the impact 
of the broader political context extant in each country. This analysis has been com-
prehensively undertaken elsewhere by Traxler and his colleagues (Traxler et al. 
2001), who demonstrate in conceptual and empirical terms how power and politics 
universally underpins the organisation of interests and the operation of bargaining 
systems, and also explains sources of variation between countries
1
.
In Part II we present our empirical results in order to examine the changing na-
ture of collective bargaining firstly in terms of the firm-sector relationship, and sec-
ondly within the firm. In Part III we return to our consideration of the underlying 
transaction costs and power relations dynamics to analyse this state of flux. First we 
provide a brief exposition of methods. 
Methods 
The eight case study firms provide an excellent test site to examine the nature 
and level of externalisation-internalisation and centralisation-decentralisation in dif-
ferent national and sectoral contexts. Each is a large MNC with extensive interna-
tional operations. Where sector-level bargaining still prevails, the case study compa-
 
1
An important power dynamic is the nature of workplace representation, which differs in struc-
tural terms between countries according to formal relationship with the union (union branch or 
independent), mode of institutionalisation (voluntary or statutory, and dependent on union 
constitution, collective agreement or labour law), and relationship with management (distinct 
or joint committee) (Visser 1993, cited in Traxler/Blaschke/Kittel 2001: 119). Hence although 
a general cyclical trend may be observed across countries in the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining linked to changes in the labour market context which favoured workers in the 
1970s (promoting local pay bargaining to protect real wages) and employers in the 1990s 
(promoting local bargaining linked to ability to pay and also a local flexible working time 
agenda), the mode of both waves of decentralisation, and their impact on multi-employer 
bargaining, was highly contingent on its legal framework and on a countrys pattern of em-
ployee representatives (Traxler/Blaschke/Kittel 2001: 132). 
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nies are either the leading or one of a leading group of companies within the employ-
ers association. They are therefore influential in shaping developments in their re-
spective sector agreements. The four countries provide very different settings. Great 
Britain is the least regulated country in terms of industrial relations, where the sys-
tem is characterised as one of voluntarism. Germany maintains an elaborate dual 
system based on clear legal entitlements for works councils and trade union co-
determination. Belgium and Italy fall somewhere between these two models, with ex-
tensive rights for trade union participation, and also some re-nationalisation of indus-
trial relations at inter-sectoral level in the last decade.  
The two sectors also provide a useful context for examining the different pres-
sures faced by manufacturing and service firms. The extent of internalisation differs 
between and within the sectors. In metalworking, and in the automotive part of the 
sector from which three out of our four cases are drawn, markets and competition are 
already highly internationalised and companies are increasingly integrating their 
production operations across borders, both within but also beyond the EEA. In bank-
ing, there are significant differences in the degree of internationalisation across mar-
ket segments. Investment banking is already global in the scope of competition; 
commercial banking is becoming increasingly internationalised as the large banks 
look to service multinational customers across the world. Yet retail banking remains 
largely a domestic affair. There are similarities as well as differences, however, in 
that both sectors face increasing competition and re-composition due to technologi-
cal change and diversification. The rise of direct banking and call centre operations 
is one example in the finance sector, and information and communication technology 
(ICT) operations in metalworking, where new areas of activity are serving to blur the 
traditional boundaries of the sector. Large MNCs, with their access to huge start-up 
capital, are at the forefront of these challenges to the sector. 
The nature of the case study companies as large and dominant players within 
their field allows us to analyse the differential impact of country and sector factors 
on organisational change and to draw some wider conclusions relevant to other 
firms. As with any case study research, however, we remain cautious in generalising 
the results. As acknowledged in the discussion, company-specific features like pat-
terns of ownership and particular branches of activity are important in shaping the 
structures and agenda of collective bargaining. Yet there are power and transaction-
cost factors common to other large firms that shape a shared context for decisions 
about the relation of company to sector arrangements and the nature of decentralisa-
tion within the firm - one example is the strength of IG-Metall in German metalwork-
ing. It is the analytical framework that we seek to develop and generalise, without 
making a case for statistical representativeness on the part of the case study firms 
(Edwards 1992). The selection of firms was informed by a multiple case logic 
which seeks not to generalise to a population but rather to examine the soft proc-
esses and dynamics within each case through a comparative national and sectoral 
analysis that can generate additional insights (Eisenhardt 2001; Eisenhardt/Bour-
geois 1988) 
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Six case studies are used to explore the changing relationship of the firm to sec-
toral collective bargaining arrangements, one from each sector in the three countries 
where sector MEB is maintained. Two further firms from Britain are added to inform 
the analysis of internalisation tendencies in terms of the centralisation or decentrali-
sation of collective bargaining within the organisation. In each of the cases, a series 
of interviews (around five in each case) was conducted with management and trade 
union representatives, at group, and where appropriate, business division levels in 
the organisation, building on an earlier extensive programme of interviews at sector 
level (see Marginson/Sisson/Arrowsmith 2003). The topics covered included the 
business context, industrial relations structures, the relationship between the sector 
and company levels, and the company-level bargaining agenda (e.g. pay, working 
time, employment, training) and outcomes. The research was conducted from August 
2001 until June 2002, organised and conducted with partner institutes in each of the 
three continental countries. The cases are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2.  The case study firms 
Metal Description 
Bel-
metal 
US-owned producer of mobile machinery and engines. In Belgium, the company 
is based mainly at one site, the largest outside the US, but is under pressure as a 
relatively high-cost location within the parent companys European operations 
Ital-
metal 
Large and diverse Italian-based group with interests in auto, mobile machinery, 
commercial vehicles, and aviation as well as significant service sector activities 
more recently. One major business sustaining heavy losses, but other activities 
profitable. Still largely family-owned.  
Ger-
metal 
German-owned group.  Leading international automotive components manufac-
turer, but seeking to reduce this dependence by diversification.  
Brit-
metal 
UK-based company with large market presence in aerospace and interests in ma-
rine and energy sectors. More intense competition in repair and overhaul market 
than that for original equipment. Operations in Germany and North America as 
well as Britain.  
Banking Description 
Belbank A leading bank in Benelux, and a leader in some insurance segments. The product 
of an early cross-border merger in financial services. Extensive internal change 
following acquisition of a major Belgian bank in 1998. 
Italbank A leading, and most profitable bank, in Italy. Product of a series of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Ger-
bank 
One of the four large German private banks, with an expanding international 
presence in investment banking. 
Brit-
bank 
Large UK-based financial services company with a major international presence, 
including beyond Europe 
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2. Sector and firm collective bargaining in flux 
2.1 Externalisation and internalisation: From sector to firm? 
Our analysis of the (changing) relationship between the leading firms that con-
stitute our case studies and their respective sector agreements in Belgium, Germany 
and Italy is structured around four considerations. These are, in turn, the form of 
the sector agreement itself; the reach of the sector agreement across each company; 
the relationship of the company to the sector agreement; and the trajectory of that 
relationship, in terms of the changes, if any, that the companies are pressing for.  
The first category, form, refers to the scope for second level bargaining pro-
vided for by the sector agreement, that is, whether it is comprehensive in terms of 
content; comprehensive but with exemptions provided by special clauses; or largely 
sets a framework or minimum floor. We have discussed the changing form of the 
relevant sector agreements elsewhere, based on our earlier research at sector level in 
metalworking and banking in the four countries (Marginson/Sisson/Arrowsmith 
2003). In general, the German sectors remain the most comprehensive in form, 
though with increasing availability and use of opening clauses, especially in met-
alworking. In Italian and Belgian metalworking, decentralisation has been author-
ised through a greater role for supplementary pay bargaining at company level, as 
well as extending negotiations over working-time flexibility within the sector 
framework. Company bargaining also deals with matters on which the sector agree-
ment is silent, such as pay structures or training. In Italian and Belgian banking, the 
sector agreements have become increasingly framework in form - in the first case to 
provide a sectoral benchmark for handling company restructuring; in the second to 
recognise the diversity that developed in company pay and working time practices 
when the relevant sector agreements fell into abeyance for fifteen years to 1997. In 
the UK, both sectors shifted to single-employer bargaining in the late 1980s, though 
the sector remains an important point of reference and information exchange, with 
companies being likened to ships moving in a convoy (Arrowsmith/Sisson 1999).  
Here we focus more directly on the companies themselves, in terms of the 
reach of the sector agreement upon their activities; their relationship concerning 
the implementation of the sector agreement; and the main patterns of change. 
Reach calibrates the extent to which the companies range of business activities 
comes under the coverage of the sector agreement. For example, the reach of the sec-
tor might be compromised by the development at firm level of new high-technology 
based activities, such as direct banking or ICT in metalworking, which do not easily 
fit the conventional confines of the sector. Or it might reflect a firms strategic shift 
of focus such as from retail banking to investment banking or bancassurance, or 
from manufacturing to systems (research and design) or after-sales service. Rela-
tionship draws on Sisson (1987) classification of the nature of company-level bar-
gaining under sector agreements, distinguishing between administrative, supple-
mentary and semi-autonomous types. In the first case, company bargaining is es-
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sentially concerned with the application of the terms and conditions of the multi-
employer agreement. In fact, none of our cases corresponded to the administrative 
type. The second type involves the negotiation of add-ons or extensions to the sector 
terms and conditions within its framework. The third type involves a significant 
scope for company bargaining conducted with limited reference to the multi-
employer agreement. In practice, our companies tended either to have a supplemen-
tary or semi-autonomous relationship to the sector agreement, though the distinc-
tion is not always clear cut. 
Our final device, trajectory, refers to the companies approach or policy to-
wards the future evolution of the sector agreement. Here, three broadly distinctive 
paths were evident amongst our cases. Limited reform describes those companies 
keen to see the introduction of further opening or opt-out clauses, but not pressing 
for radical change in the sector agreement. Extensive reform refers to companies 
looking to effect a qualitative change in the role of the sector agreement, for example 
from specifying detailed arrangements to frameworks. Loosening ties concerns a 
situation whereby the future commitment of the company to the sector agreement ap-
pears open and attempts have been made to move some activities out from the cover-
age of the sector agreement. These were not necessarily mutually exclusive strate-
gies. Different parts of the business could be subject to different pressures for re-
form, raising the prospect, for example, of new activities serving as a lever for 
change in the relationship of the core parts of the business to the sector arrange-
ments. 
 Metalworking 
In Germetal, the reach of the sector agreement extends to virtually all the work-
force, only two per cent of the workforce falling outside the sectoral umbrella, 
mainly in small start-up companies. There is also a special company agreement to fa-
cilitate longer working hours for engineers at the research and development centre, 
reached in close co-operation with IG-Metall. Management stressed that this re-
flected particular circumstances and did not amount to Tarifflucht, or flight from 
the sector agreement.
2
The relationship to the sector agreement in Germetal is sup-
plementary, in that, with the exception of the company agreement reached for the 
research engineers, company-level bargaining focuses on the negotiation of benefits 
additional to the sector agreement, and on working-time arrangements within its 
scope. The works councils have a considerable role in interpreting the sector agree-
 
2
In fact, the strength of the industry union IG-Metall has ensured that there has been hardly any 
flight by large firms from the sector agreement, though some smaller companies have begun 
to opt out by joining ohne tarif associations (for further details see Marginson/Sisson/Arrow-
smith 2003). The content of the agreement remains comprehensive rather than minimal, ex-
cept over certain issues such as partial retirement, and the fact that IG-Metall must agree to 
the exercise of hardship clauses has tended to limit their scope in practice. 
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ment, but these remain strongly linked to the union, helping to maintain consistency 
to the sector arrangements. Management would like this relationship to be looser, for 
example to be able to conclude an agreement over reduced working time and em-
ployment security without the need for IG-Metall to sign it off. There are also some 
concerns about the limited scope for differentiation in the sector agreement, but the 
company remains committed to it because it feels IG-Metall would achieve more 
through company bargaining. This is because the union is strong in terms of prospec-
tive strike mobilisation, and the company is also exposed to customer pressure, as a 
somewhat dependent supplier to the large auto companies, to avoid any stoppages. 
Thus, even given the large size of the company (over 200,000 employees world-
wide), as one senior manager put it, (Germetal) would be lost alone, we need the 
protection of the sector agreement. Further company bargaining is not seen to be in 
the companys interests, and senior management therefore advocate only limited re-
form.   
The reach of the sector is also comprehensive in Italmetal.3 The sector agree-
ment extends to outsourced non-core activities such as logistics and distribution, 
partly under union pressure, but also because the company did not want a fragmented 
bargaining situation within the plants. Especially significant too was the context of 
the 1999 metal sector agreement, which extended the reach of the sector to out-
sourced and related activities, in return for greater flexibility over working hours 
such as annual hours and overtime. This agreement was made in the wake of the 
transfer of telecoms activities outside the metalworking sector. In terms of relation-
ship to the sector agreement, Italmetal is semi-autonomous, since a large part of pay 
is negotiated at group level, including the criteria to be used. Also many important 
working time issues are addressed in-house, in order, it was said, to avoid paying 
twice for changes. This distancing has if anything increased as disputes over pay 
mean that both sector and company collective bargaining are currently in a kind of 
paralysis (senior manager).
4
The 2001 sector agreement was not signed by the larg-
est trade union, Fiom-Cgil, though it remains legally valid. At company level, the un-
ions jointly terminated the 1996 Italmetal group agreement in 2000 but failed to 
reach a new agreement with the company because it wanted to link payment of the 
performance bonus more closely to ability to pay. In the absence of a new collective 
agreement over pay, all but Fiom-Cgil agreed that the annual bonus should be paid 
 
3
NB: For Italmetal we refer only to the metalworking parts of the group. 
4
The crisis of the Italian system reflects the changing economic context from when the present 
two-tier system was instituted in 1993. In order to combat inflation, the 1993 inter-sector 
agreement provided for cost of living pay increases to be negotiated at sector level, with com-
pany level bargaining over additional increases to reflect productivity or performance. Low in-
flation in recent years has shifted the attention of the unions to the company level, with many 
large employers resisting further increases on cost grounds, or seeking to link it to further 
change. 
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according to the 1996 criteria. The situation is therefore very uncertain at present, 
especially because one of the most important divisions of the group is in a state of 
severe financial crisis. In terms of trajectory, Italmetal favours extensive reform. It 
dislikes having two rounds of pay negotiations, at sector and company level, which it 
feels adds to costs. It also wants the pay component negotiated at company level to 
more accurately reflect performance. Senior managers at division level, especially in 
the subsidiaries manufacturing highly customised products and / or face highly un-
predictable demand, also want more scope to negotiate their own arrangements, par-
ticularly around working-time.  
The situation of Belmetal is somewhat different, in that since a major dispute in 
1996, it has made two three-year company agreements under the sectors exceptional 
provision for restructuring.  The reach of the sector is high in formal terms, with no 
activities placed outside. Moreover, the company and its trade unions remain impor-
tant players in the sector bargaining process. The companys head of HR is a member 
of the Board of the employers association Agoria and the industrial relations man-
ager has a seat on its social (i.e. industrial relations) committee. The companys 
views carry influence within the employers association, and provisions in both the 
inter-sector and sector agreements continue to trigger company-level negotiations. 
The company-level bargaining agenda is shaped by, and there is close choreography 
with, developments in the sector agreements, for example concerning pre-pension ar-
rangements and the company-level 1% pay envelope contained in the recent sector 
agreement. Nonetheless the agenda for company bargaining is wide-ranging. The 
second three-year company agreement, concluded in 2000, concerned the end of 
wage austerity, the payments system, benefits provision, promotion principles, plan-
ning days off, and important working-time matters such as weekend working. The 
negotiations underway at the time of the research encompassed quality of employ-
ment issues (temporary contracts, pre-pension arrangements and managing the fin 
de carrier), as well as pay. Essentially, therefore, the companys relationship to the 
sector agreement is more semi-autonomous than supplementary. The trade unions in 
Belmetal view the sector agreement as a benchmark, with the main focus of collec-
tive bargaining in the company, conducted either defensively or assertively around 
this benchmark according to economic circumstances. In terms of trajectory, Bel-
metal welcomes the opening of the sector agreement, such as the scope for one per 
cent of the pay award to be negotiated at company level, but is not likely to revoke 
its exemption status without further envelopes and extensive reform in the future. 
Working time is one area where the sector agreement is seen as restrictive, for exam-
ple there are strict limits on overtime and compensation can only be in the form of 
time off rather than pay.  
 Banking 
In banking, in contrast to metalworking, it is in Germany where the company is 
most keen to loosen ties to the sector. The private banking sector agreement has con-
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cluded opening clauses in recent years on working time reduction to provide for em-
ployment security in the context of restructuring, and on long-term working time ac-
counts. However, Gerbank is looking for further flexibility, particularly over work-
ing time, which was a source of dispute (over Saturday working) during the 1999 
sector agreement. This is despite the fact that the reach of the sector agreement is far 
from complete. Approaching a third of staff already fall outside the coverage of the 
sector. The companys services division uses the sector as a reference, but a part of 
its IT operations has its own company agreement, which departs substantially from 
the sector agreement (for example in having salary bands not points). Gerbanks di-
rect banking operation was established as a new subsidiary outside the reach of the 
sector agreement. Indeed, the company proposed to place the whole of its retail and 
direct banking division, and its new outsourced processing subsidiary, outside the 
sector agreement when it restructured in 1999. This was successfully resisted by the 
trade unions and the works councils, but only with them making concessions over 
Saturday opening and variable pay. For the trade union, a key dilemma is whether to 
attempt to conclude (further) company agreements for those parts of Gerbank which 
are outside of the sector agreement. These would provide joint regulation of terms 
and conditions of staff, but at the cost of giving recognition to the undermining of 
the sector agreement. According to a Ver.di official responsible for the bank, a 
company agreement is not normal, it is a challenge for the trade unions  the bank-
ing sector is seeing erosion [of the system of sector bargaining] at its borders.  
Pressure to move from the sector framework continues in Gerbank. A recent ex-
ample was the proposal to lay off 1200 customer service staff and re-engage 900 of 
them as self-employed workers with performance-based pay. The general works 
councils, of which there are four since the re-organisation of the company, also have 
an increasing role in collective bargaining, both where the sector agreement is si-
lent (e.g. appraisal), where it establishes only a framework (e.g. working time distri-
bution), and where there is an opening clause (e.g. long term working time accounts). 
Some 25 company agreements have been concluded within the past two years cover-
ing issues such as outsourcing, layoffs, employment security, working hours in the 
transition to the Euro, appraisal-set pay, and temporary agency employment. Never-
theless, even with this flexibility, the company commented that it cannot be certain 
that it will remain under the coverage of the sector in the future (we need more and 
more opening clauses, more windows, more flexibility so as to achieve differentia-
tion, senior manager). Essentially, therefore, to the extent that  Gerbank remains 
within the system for its mainstream banking activities, its relationship to the sector 
agreement remains more supplementary than  semi-autonomous. The trajectory is 
one of continuing loosening ties.  
The reach of the banking sector agreement in Belbank is in contrast virtually 
comprehensive for the groups banking operations. Prior to the 1998 acquisition of 
the a large private sector bank, the groups banking operation in Belgium was a for-
mer public-sector bank which followed the sector agreement for public credit institu-
tions. These were transferred to the private banks sector agreement following the 
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merger of the two banking operations. The call centres of the acquired bank had been 
registered under the auxiliary agreement for white-collar workers, which specifies in-
ferior terms and conditions to either of the two banking agreements and provides for 
greater flexibility of working. However, under a recent company agreement these 
staff will be moved back into the private banks agreement as from January 2003. 
Neither is Belbank pursuing the franchised branch model that some of its competitors 
have used to place large part of their operations outside the sector agreement.  
In terms of form, the Belgian private sector banking agreement of 1997 was the 
first for 15 years, partly the outcome of government pressure, and partly because of a 
weakening of the unions position reflecting increased competition, mergers and re-
structuring, and membership decline. The agreement provides sufficient scope for 
bargaining at company level that Belbanks relationship to it is effectively semi-
autonomous. For example, a recent agreement at sector level to reduce working 
hours from 1780 to 1620 per year leaves it to the company to decide how this should 
be managed, whether through reduced basic hours or increased leave. Likewise the 
sector agreement arrives at the annual pay award, but implementation is a matter for 
the company in discussion with the délégation syndicale (national union committee). 
Current negotiations over a unified payments structure for the merged banking 
operation further illustrate the discretion available. The private banks sector has a 
rather traditional agreement, dating back to the 1950s, based on allocating jobs to 
points on the scale and progression according to seniority. Amongst the public sector 
banks, there is no sector-level system but a series of company-based house 
schemes. Negotiations at Belbank on a new, unified scheme are moving in the direc-
tion of the competency-based system that operates in ex-public-sector part of the 
bank. So long as such a scheme could be shown to improve on the current private 
banks sector system, agreement would be seen to represent a major innovation within 
the sector. Indeed both sides anticipated that it might result in a re-working of the 
sector agreement along similar lines at a future date.  
Belbank is committed to the sector agreement, with one important proviso, in 
that it wants the private banks agreement to more closely resemble the accord cadre 
or framework agreement of the public sector banks to allow for greater differentia-
tion at company level. As the product of a merger of a large private and an ex-public 
bank, management and trade unions at Belbank have experience of both agreements. 
The conduct and outcomes of collective bargaining was said by management, and 
also by some trade union representatives, to have been much more constructive in 
the latter. The future role of the sector agreement is currently close to deadlock, but a 
second development might provide the key to a breakthrough. It is possible that the 
sector agreements for private, public and small banks will be consolidated into one, 
which would provide impetus to the shift to a framework approach rather than the 
existing detailed model of the private banks. The trajectory is therefore one of fa-
vouring extensive reform. 
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In Italbank, the reach of the sector agreement sector agreement is high, with no 
parts of the company falling outside. Negotiations at sector level have been used to 
provide a framework for managing the restructuring process resulting from increased 
competition, the application of new technology and rapid industry concentration. Re-
cent sector agreements have dealt with pay restraint, job reclassification, outsourcing 
and redundancy, with the establishment of a redundancy fund (or social shock ab-
sorber) in 1999. That agreement also allowed greater scope for bargaining at com-
pany level, for example over working time. However company bargaining within 
Italbank remains focused on the traditional issues of productivity payments and job 
classifications as laid down by the 1993 inter-sector agreement, so in practice, in the 
words of a senior union representative from Fisac-Cgil, little has changed. The re-
lationship of the company to the sector remains supplementary. In some respects this 
is because the sector has been the focus for managing change; in others because of 
the continued importance of the law in regulating issues like atypical work. Italbank 
is in the process of moving from a federal organisation structure that recognised the 
integrity of its seven founding banks to one based on three business divisions. This 
might lead to greater flexibility at company level in the future to reflect the distinct-
iveness of the retail, corporate and private banking operations. However the com-
pany stated that for the present it did not advocate significant reform. 
The overall pattern suggests both sector- and country-based differences. In their 
form agreements in metalworking tend to be relatively more comprehensive in the 
range of issues addressed than in banking, and to provide for universal rather than 
minimum standards (Marginson/Arrowsmith/Sisson 2003). Probably reflecting this, 
agreements in metalworking contain relatively more formal openings for negotia-
tions at company level than do those in banking. For instance, there is no parallel to 
the hardship clauses found in metalworking agreements  taken up by Belmetal - in 
the banking sector.  From this perspective, the importance of the external framework 
provided by the sector agreement for the large companies surveyed tends to be 
greater in metalworking than in banking. Put another way, a company-specific, inter-
nal framework looms larger amongst the banks  with the important exception, for 
the present, of Italbank. The form of the sector agreement also shows a country di-
mension, with greater elasticity in the Italian and Belgian sector agreements than in 
Germany (Marginson/Arrowsmith/Sisson 2003). This, together with a growing dif-
ferentiation of activities, helps explain why Gerbank has sought a greater scope for 
organisation-based arrangements to the extent of removing emerging parts of the 
groups activities from the scope of the sector agreement. Gerbank apart, however, 
the reach of the sector agreement is high in all of the other cases.  
Turning to the relationship between the sector and company levels, neither 
sector nor country patterns are easy to discern. Striking, however, is the difference 
evident in trajectory between the two sectors. The banks are more strongly in fa-
vour of reform, with the exception of the Italian bank where the special consideration 
is the use of MEB as an instrument to manage rapid restructuring. This was itself a 
product of the high costs and rigidities of the Italian banking sector (Regini et al. 
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1999), tacitly acknowledged by the trade unions, who secured an extension of the 
reach of the sector in return. 
A final comment on changing sector-firm relationships is based on the evidence 
of the British case studies. That is, the pursuit of organisation-based collective bar-
gaining does not mean that the sector is wholly redundant as a reference point (see 
also Arrowsmith/Sisson 1999). The sector remains important both directly, in terms 
of the horizontal relationships actively maintained through management and trade 
union networks, and indirectly in the emergence of common understandings of basic 
industry terms and conditions such as a standard or going rate for pay. Britmetal,
for example, remains a member of the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF), 
and its representatives sit on the EEFs Employment Policy Committee. Senior union 
negotiators in the company referred to the importance of external benchmarks in pay 
bargaining in particular. A similar situation was also found in banking. Though Brit-
bank was instrumental in the break up of the London Clearing Banks Agreement, it 
too maintains strong informal links with the handful of other major national banks, 
all of which negotiate with the same trade union. The relevance of this was perhaps 
made most forcefully by the representative of the Belgian metalworking employers 
association Agoria; the liberty of the real company agreement does not exist, be-
cause all companies would be negotiating around similar issues with the same un-
ions. 
2.2  Collective bargaining within the firm: From heteronomy to autonomy? 
Collective bargaining within the firm can be described in terms of level, recog-
nising any differences between formality and practice, and changes in level. Our 
cases indicate that there appears to be no necessary relationship between changes in 
bargaining arrangements outside the firm and changes within the firm: a range of 
contingent factors intervene. There are important differences between the sectors. 
Decentralisation pressures are more a feature of metalworking than banking. As dis-
cussed more fully below, this reflects different market contexts of product differen-
tiation, intensity of competition and variability of demand, all of which figure more 
in metalworking than banking. It also reflects the transaction costs features of merg-
ers and acquisitions. Mergers have different implications because of the order of 
scale and because the companies are often involved in similar activities, so the proc-
ess is usually one of integration and rationalisation. This is more efficient to manage 
in a top-down way, so mergers have a strong centralisation tendency, in the transition 
stages at least. In metalworking, the established pattern for our case study firms is 
one of acquisitions and divestments more than mergers. This often involves moving 
in and out of different areas of activity, including as part of a diversification strategy, 
so acquisitions can introduce a decentralisation dynamic into the firm. The relatively 
recent deregulation of banking in most European member states has promoted rapid 
industry concentration through mergers as well as by acquisition. The process of 
growth and consolidation has been managed at peak level within the firms con-
cerned. 
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Metalworking 
The level of collective bargaining in Italmetal is focused at group level for pay, 
though this is under some pressure. The companys desire to introduce greater vari-
ability in its existing highly centralised pay structure led to the current deadlock in 
collective bargaining. Presently it is group-wide performance that determines the 
level of the bonus, but the very different achievements of the divisions has brought 
this increasingly into question. It is possible that the firm might dispose of its loss-
making division, though it is difficult to say whether this would trigger a greater role 
for collective bargaining at the level of the subsidiary companies or consolidate the 
status of group-level bargaining. The former is a distinct possibility given the strate-
gic shift of the company into service-sector activities such as finance and energy dis-
tribution. Furthermore, each of the major metalworking divisions has recently intro-
duced devolved management structures with reorganisation on business unit lines. 
The auto division has restructured into four autonomous business units, and a close 
alliance has been formed with an external company. The trucks division, which has 
grown by international acquisition, has also divided into four business units based on 
market segment. Further diversification is also likely as the company looks for manu-
facturing partnerships and expands its non-manufacturing servicing activities. The 
heavy equipment division is also implementing a rationalisation plan in the wake of 
its 1999 merger. 
Certainly, senior managers in the different companies, and some of the union 
representatives, felt that differentiation was already taking place, especially over 
working time, because of the very different market contexts that the constituent firms 
operated in. Collective bargaining over working time occurs at plant level, within the 
framework of the sector and company agreements, through the Rappresentanze Sin-
dacali Unitarie, which are largely elected from trade union lists. They also have bar-
gaining responsibilities for any layoffs. Management argued that the Italian opera-
tions lacked the flexibility achieved in other countries, because of the highly politi-
cised context for collective bargaining, though cross-border benchmarks were widely 
used within the divisions to influence the local bargaining agenda, especially over 
working time at plant level. The situation is therefore one of formal continuity, 
though under pressure, and with local bargaining becoming increasingly important 
over issues like working time. So far, however, the level of collective bargaining has 
not followed the changes in business organisation in terms of devolution. 
In Germetal, the level of collective bargaining is also fairly centralised, though 
becoming more dispersed in the wake of a recent major acquisition. The works coun-
cils have an important collective bargaining role in the company, though conducted 
firmly within the context of the sector agreement. The acquisition of an automation 
technology business in 2000 means that there are now two large general works coun-
cils that bargain over matters common to all plants in the relevant parts of the busi-
ness (e.g. bonus and additional shift payments, partial retirement and pensions, and 
the framework conditions for working time). Local plant-level works councils have 
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formal responsibility for the negotiation of a wide range of implementation matters, 
though in reality all important issues are choreographed by the central works council. 
A recent example was a local agreement to reduce working time rather than layoff 
staff, in which the higher works council was closely involved. The group-level works 
council, which covers the two major divisions and a number of smaller subsidiaries, 
has traditionally had more an information-sharing than a bargaining role, though its 
co-ordinating role has expanded with the creation of two general works councils re-
flecting growing diversification of the groups activities.  
Collective bargaining is therefore firmly established at local and, especially, 
central levels through the works councils, rather than through the various business 
streams and profit-centre business units of the company. The union serves as an inte-
grating force, as there are close links between IG-Metall and the works councils at 
each level, including in the plants (where union membership remains high), and both 
the union and works councils are represented on the supervisory board. In this sense, 
Germetal remains a very German company, embedded in the institutional structures 
in a way that, say, GM Opel, one of its biggest customers, is not. Though the com-
pany conducts international benchmarking between plants, and does play this card 
in negotiations, senior management said that the union and the works council would 
not countenance some of the changes introduced in the US-owned firm. 
The company level is the focus of collective bargaining in Belmetal, though in 
effect this translates as plant-level bargaining since the company mainly operates out 
of one (large) manufacturing site (separate arrangements cover a separate and much 
smaller site). The works council (conseil dentreprise), which meets monthly, has a 
mainly consultative role but has some decision-making authority over working time 
and redundancy issues. In practice, the works council ratifies some of the agreements 
reached between the company and the union. As well as the standing negotiating 
committee, management meets with the regional full-time union officers three or for 
times per year and the national officers once or twice. There is no collective bargain-
ing by business stream, but there is increasing differentiation in working practices. 
Restructuring in 1996 introduced profit centres and these have some autonomy over 
work organisation, so different patterns of working time have emerged within the 
site. This is because workers are essentially organised within teams in the different 
profit centres, so patterns of overwork and underwork can occur alongside. Further 
restructuring will introduce international service lines for some products, which is 
likely to lead to further differentiation. Intense international benchmarking exercises 
on costs are already underway, especially comparing Belgian operations to the plants 
in France, where activities are similar, and the UK, where labour costs are lower. 
Senior union representatives said that they feared that the introduction of interna-
tional product lines will undermine the status of the site as an integrated entity. 
Decentralisation has gone furthest in Britmetal, which has become an increas-
ingly diverse group through expansion beyond its core activities of aerospace. After-
sales service as well as manufacture has also become increasingly important. Re-
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structuring in 1998 introduced a complex matrix structure for the organisation, de-
signed to devolve operational responsibility to business units within the four main 
business streams. Reinforcing this was the introduction of a make or buy policy, 
basically an outsourcing test, which has put pressure on the component manufacture 
operations in particular. The level of collective bargaining is a mix of site and busi-
ness-level, with certain issues like pensions dealt with at group level. The company 
is trying to shift from site to business-based bargaining so that the industrial relations 
structure mirrors the organisational structure, but this has had patchy results as many 
of the sites are single-business operations. The central industrial relations depart-
ments at the two principal multi-business sites were abolished in 2000. Though pay 
continues to be addressed at site level, except for particular business units in highly 
competitive sectors such as repair and overhaul which have autonomy over pay-
setting, other matters are increasingly devolved. This had led to differences emerging 
within sites in work organisation, shift systems, discipline and grievance procedures, 
job classification structures and progression criteria.  
The further devolution of pay bargaining has not been an urgent concern so far 
for several reasons. First, in a context of low inflation and high competition for or-
ders, pay settlements are relatively low. Even with relatively low unemployment, the 
unions are generally concerned less with pay than job security, placing a high prior-
ity on being involved in discussions over alternatives to redundancy such as work-
flow organisation, shift patterns, training and redeployment, and voluntary sever-
ance. Significantly, many of these issues are dealt with at local level. Second, pay 
continues to be governed by informal co-ordination and informed by perceptions of a 
going rate. The unions believe that in reality the company as a whole has a common 
pay policy and, though there is some internal competition between plants (its site 
survival in a competitive world, union negotiator), there is also some internal liaison 
and pattern bargaining (the negotiations start in Bristol and ricochet around). The 
manual unions have a national combine committee covering all sites, which meets 
twice a year, and one of the staff unions also maintains a national advisory commit-
tee. Third, the devolution achieved so far has not been unproblematic. The unions re-
acted strongly when seemingly piecemeal redundancies in one of the businesses were 
found to be part of a wider scheme. There are also management problems of duplica-
tion and co-ordination in order to avoid precedent-setting and other adverse effects 
on different parts of the business.  
The unions, which have over 90 per cent density for manual workers and over 
60 per cent for staff, are also keen to retain a role for the site. Redundancy agree-
ments are now supposed to be business and not site-based, but in reality these are 
negotiated and signed off at site level. Works committees have also been concerned 
to ensure that developments like seven-day working are contained to specific/ small 
areas where necessary, and they maintain a licensing role to avoid management 
precedent-setting. Thus, management want further devolution of bargaining to the 
business units within the sites in order to promote tailored solutions that do not pro-
ceed at the pace of the slowest part of the business. However this has encountered 
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some of the problems of leapfrogging that first led to the centralisation of bargaining 
some thirty years ago. 
 Banking 
The company level is the most important for collective bargaining in Belbank.
The industrial relations structure recognises the company as a social entity and so 
transcends the business line structures, which differentiates between retail and com-
mercial banking, asset management and the call centre operations. The most impor-
tant body is the national union committee (délégation syndicale nationale) at com-
pany level, which meets bi-monthly and implements its agreements through 16 terri-
torially-based local committees. Union density is around 75, and 55, per cent in the 
former public-, and private-, sector banks, respectively. The conseil dentreprise re-
tains a right to be consultation and must give its agreement on certain matters. Also 
important are the seven geographically-based health and safety committees, which 
have become increasingly prominent by addressing quality of working life issues 
such as stress and employee well-being. Because of this, the work of these commit-
tees is now co-ordinated by a national (joint) platform that meets twice a month.  
Though some of the employee representatives said that the HR managers within 
the businesses are expanding their role, particularly over working time, collective 
bargaining remains highly centralised. This reflects the fact that the company was 
only formed in 1998 out of a merger between a private and ex-public sector bank 
with distinctively different trade unions and collective bargaining traditions. Transi-
tional arrangements in the integration of the two companies, including the harmoni-
sation of the different job classification and pay systems, had to be formulated and 
negotiated centrally. So did the strategy for eliminating duplication and cutting costs, 
focusing on branch closures (with the loss of 4,000 jobs) and early retirement, which 
involved a large transfer between the two pension funds. The effect of large-scale 
merger and subsequent rationalisation has therefore been to reinforce centralisation 
in collective bargaining.  
Mergers are also crucial to understanding developments in Italbank, which 
traces its origins to a privatisation in 1993. That bank merged with another in 1994, 
four more in 1998 (to form Italbank) and two others a year later. Until recently, the 
seven constituent banks maintained a high degree of autonomy in industrial relations. 
Company level bargaining, which is responsible primarily for setting performance 
pay under Italys two-tier system, took place at the level of the individual bank. The 
process of integration was complex because of significant differences between the 
banks  the savings banks, for example, traditionally have had stronger regional ties, 
higher pay, and less systematic criteria for bargaining over job classifications and the 
performance bonus. Co-ordination between the banks was also made difficult by 
multiple union representation. Each of the seven banks had three confederal unions, 
two management unions and two autonomous unions. The negotiations between the 
unions that led to an agreement on industrial relations in 1998, forming a delegation 
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to negotiate with the company, involved 150 trade union representatives from all the 
banks in the group. However, a Group Protocol was signed in 1999 that introduced a 
new form of representation at group level for the first time, to facilitate greater stan-
dardisation of terms and conditions, including pay. In 2002 the organisational struc-
ture was transformed as the individual banks were formally absorbed and a divisional 
structure introduced based on separation of retail, corporate and private banking. At 
the same time (December 2001) a major rationalisation programme was announced 
to yield planned savings of 720 million Euros a year by 2004. It is possible that the 
divisions might eventually take on greater responsibility for collective bargaining, 
but for the meantime Italbank remains highly centralised.   
Rationalisation pressures are also strong in Gerbank, where 9,000 job cuts were 
announced in 2001, followed a year later by a further 3,800 in the investment bank-
ing operations. The expansion of its international investment banking presence has 
been an important company strategy, realised by the acquisition of a leading UK firm 
in 1989 and a major US firm in 1999. Retail banking is seen as less important be-
cause of lower operating margins and growth potential. This segment is dominated 
by state and co-operative banks, and the big four private banks have only a 12 per 
cent market share between them. Within the company, the main focus for collective 
bargaining is the works councils. A major reorganisation in 1999 replaced eight divi-
sions with two main business streams, and set up four general works councils instead 
of one. The works councils have been active in collective bargaining, with increasing 
differentiation in employment practices and conditions as a result. Most issues are 
decided by the two large general works councils representing the retail and non-retail 
banking operations, which also co-ordinate activities over major issues, for example 
through a joint negotiating committee on restructuring. Collective bargaining also 
occurs at the group-level works council as appropriate, most recently concerning 
working-time arrangements under the transition to the Euro.  
Trade union density, at 10 per cent, is slightly lower than the other private 
banks, and the free list representatives play an important part in the works councils. 
Trade unionists tend to hold the key positions but the closeness of the works councils 
to the unions vary; a trend in recent years for example has been the appointment of 
lawyers rather than union officials as the nominated expert. Management is certainly 
keen to differentiate between the trade unions and the works councils. In any case the 
traditional universal structure of Gerbank was terminated with the transfer of retail 
operations into the subsidiary set up for direct banking. Support services and back-
office work were also transferred to two newly established companies. The IT com-
pany has its own collective agreement, and the call centres none at all. The threat to 
take retail as well as the new companies outside the sector agreement secured major 
concessions from the works councils and trade unions, including individual perform-
ance pay. The increased differentiation of the business has therefore resulted in dif-
ferentiated bargaining within the company.  
Industrielle Beziehungen, 10. Jg., Heft 3, 2003 385 
In contrast, Britbank has highly centralised industrial relations, especially in 
terms of the annual bargaining round (there is no standing negotiating committee and 
management-union contact at company level is ad hoc between the annual set-piece 
negotiations over pay). This partly reflects its branding and corporate culture strate-
gies of establishing One Bank. Both senior management, and the union, also 
stressed that it helped to make life easier. Several of the banks major competitors, of 
which a number of senior managers as well as the unions chief negotiator had direct 
experience, had shifted to highly fragmented structures but this was seen as ineffi-
cient and unstable. Britbank maintained the same salary scale for its processing and 
call centre staff as for those employed in the retail branches. However there has been 
some differentiation in recent years, notably a regional dimension to pay introduced 
in 2001, in return for some lifting of the ceilings on pay progression. Pay has also 
become more individualised by linking it to individual performance appraisal. Fur-
thermore, human resource and line managers within the regions are free to develop 
their own initiatives around working time. Another significant change was the de-
recognition of the unions for management staff in 1996, though a national consulta-
tion forum was introduced in 2001. 
Thus, though a centralised level of collective bargaining remains in most of the 
case study companies, there is presently greater differentiation and localisation in 
metalworking than in banking. The high degree of centralisation of collective bar-
gaining in banking reflects a greater standardisation of product, greater market stabil-
ity and higher profitability, and a legacy of domestic sector concentration through 
mergers that presents an efficiency case for higher-level bargaining. The exceptional 
case is Gerbank, which is seeking to escape the rigid confines of the traditional Ger-
man sector and company-based arrangements, with some measure of success. The 
key difference between Gerbank and Germetal in this regard is the bargaining agent. 
Trade union density is much higher in the metalworking company, and the works 
councils much more union-dominated than in banking. We now turn to discuss these 
power and transaction cost factors more explicitly in the next section. 
3. Discussion 
Our focus on the changing balance between the levels of collective bargaining 
within and without the firm suggests a number of country and sector differences in 
banking and metalworking in the four countries. First, there is some tendency for the 
banks to be more internalised than the metalworking companies, for whom the exter-
nal framework of the sector agreement remains a relatively more salient reference 
point. A key consideration is the relative weakness of trade unions, as compared to 
their metalworking counterparts which exercise tighter control over company-level 
developments. The banks are also generally more in favour of reform, to the extent 
that Gerbank is seeking to loosen its ties to the sector agreement by exercising open-
ing clauses and placing operations beyond its reach. Country factors are relevant in 
explaining the relative inelasticity of the sector arrangements in German banking, 
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which management said was encouraging them to loosen the companys ties. In Italy, 
by contrast, multi-employer bargaining has evolved to become a more flexible in-
strument in order to promote the restructuring of the sector. An important feature of 
this has been the recent establishment of the social shock absorbers, i.e. collective 
employer funds for redundancy and early retirement found in other sectors in Italy.  
Second, collective bargaining within the firm tends to be more centralised in 
banking than in metalworking, reflecting the greater differentiation of activities and 
business structures in the metalworking firms, and exposure to more intense and in-
ternational competition. Centralisation tendencies within banking have been rein-
forced by recent mergers and acquisitions, but they are founded on the historic or-
ganisation of the sector, characterised by a large number of small workplaces 
(branches), with little or no tradition of workplace bargaining. Trade union organisa-
tion and militancy was contained by the provision of the benefits associated with so-
phisticated internal labour markets  security of employment, promotion ladders and 
superior employee benefits and welfare. In contrast, metalworking firms were char-
acterised by relatively larger workplaces with strong trade union organisation and 
collective bargaining, whether formal or informal, at workplace level. Hence, in 
Great Britain, where single-employer bargaining now prevails in both sectors, this 
has been associated with the decentralisation of collective bargaining within the firm 
in metalworking, but much less so in banking. Country factors do also intervene. Dif-
ferent institutional frameworks reflect historical and political differences in legal sys-
tems, business structures and collective bargaining traditions in the different coun-
tries. Crudely put, these national contexts mean that there is a continuum of company 
autonomy, with Germany and Britain providing the polar extremes, and Italy and 
Belgium in between.   
The issue is therefore not so much country versus sector factors but how these 
relate and how they unfold over time. The underlying dynamics are power and trans-
action cost factors. Transaction cost factors refer to management considerations of 
the most efficient level to conduct collective bargaining. In part they are a function 
of scale and homogeneity. Large companies with standardised products or services 
might be able to minimise the transactions involved in collective bargaining by 
centralising the process, even delegating it outside the firm. Multi-employer bargain-
ing means, in principle, that a large part of labour costs are standardised across the 
sector, ensuring an important degree of stability in business planning, and ensuring 
that competitor firms face similar constraints. Conversely, greater differentiation of 
activities introduces a decentralisation dynamic both within and without the firm, es-
pecially in a business context of intense competition and rapid technological change. 
Of course, appreciation of transaction costs is also informed by considerations of 
power. A strong trade union can provide a further centralisation and externalisation 
imperative for management in order to maximise the collective strength of the em-
ployer(s), as well as to minimise the time and resources consumed by  potentially 
conflictual - local collective bargaining. Trade union strength reflects national fac-
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tors to do with legal support for its role as a bargaining agent, as well as sector char-
acteristics to do with labour scarcity, skill and disruptive capacity. 
An indicative summary of the main transaction cost and power factors facing 
our case study firms, in terms of both prevailing state and change trajectory, is pro-
vided by Table 3. The table focuses on the externalisation-internalisation dimension, 
but a similar mapping can be used to analyse the key variables involved in shaping 
the level of collective bargaining within the firm. Pluses, (+) [+] respectively for 
state and change, indicate tendencies favouring externalisation, whereas mi-
nuses, (-) [-] respectively for state and change, indicated those pointing towards 
internalisation. The main pattern is pluses and minuses in the columns for both sec-
tors on state,  reflecting a degree of ambivalence towards MEB by major employers 
in both sectors. There are more minuses for change than state, indicating the pres-
sures for reform of the relationship between the firms and MEB. This does not mean 
the end of MEB, however, because of the weight of some of the remaining plus fac-
tors.  
A significant factor, especially in metalworking where trade union organisation 
is at its strongest, is the institutional arrangements for employee representation. The 
unions are legitimate bargaining agents at company level in the Italian and Belgian 
systems, and the reality for the larger companies is that they must be faced whether 
the firm remains in or out of the sector agreement. In Germany the works councils 
are accorded significant bargaining responsibility (Bispinck/Schulten 2002), but 
again the reality is that these have close links to the trade unions, especially in larger 
metalworking companies (Klikauer 2002), to the extent that Germetal is wedded to 
the sector arrangements because of the strength of IG-Metall. In Italy, in the face of 
strongly organised metalworking unions our case study company has found it more 
convenient to stay within the sector framework, though this has been in the balance 
in the past and is presently on hold. Even at Belmetal, which currently has a company 
agreement under the sectors exemption clause, the details negotiated at company le-
vel have to be signed off with the union at sector level. 
In terms of centralisation and decentralisation tendencies within the firm, the 
primary driver of local collective bargaining is the diversification of business activi-
ties. Virtually all the case study companies have experienced major re-organisation 
in recent years, reflecting changes in their business portfolios and new business 
models such as the separation of customer-facing and back-end activities to cut costs. 
In banking as well as metalworking, management responsibility is increasingly being 
specified at divisional or business-stream level, with further devolution to business 
units evident in metalworking in particular. Collective bargaining structures are un-
derstandably under pressure to follow suit on the grounds of efficiency, though with 
the consequence also of fragmenting trade union representation. Arguably, however, 
trade union strength is a major constraint on decentralisation within the firm, though 
as the case of UK banking also shows, transaction cost considerations also apply.  
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Table 3: Power and transaction costs factors shaping the state and change of sector multi-employer 
bargaining (MEB ) 
Sector/ product 
market: 
Metal Externalisation 
implication:  
(state)       
[change] 
Finance Externalisation 
implication:  
(state)     
[change] 
Concentration Still lots of players 
across sector even 
if high within mar-
ket segments 
(+) 
 
[+] High except for 
Germany. 
Increasing con-
centration 
(-) [-] 
Internationalisa-
tion 
Growing interna-
tional competition 
and ownership 
(-) [-] Retail banking 
largely domestic 
in competition 
and ownership. 
Some interna-
tionalisation of 
back office 
(+) [+/-] 
Heterogeneity High. Increasing 
due to new tech-
nology: new activi-
ties eg ICT, and 
work organisation 
(Cad/cam; jit). 
Shift to after-sales 
with manufactur-
ing margins 
squeezed 
(-) [- -] Low, but in-
creasing due to 
new technology: 
facilitating sepa-
ration of back 
office work, call 
centres, internet 
and direct bank-
ing. 
Bancassurance 
(+) [- -] 
Trade union 
strength 
High, but generally 
lower than in past 
(+) [-] Lower than 
metal 
(-) [-] 
Company  
Merger/ acquisi-
tion 
Acquisitions and 
divestments: tend 
to reinforce diver-
sification 
(-) [-] Mergers: inter-
nalisation and 
centralisation to 
manage integra-
tion and ration-
alisation 
(-) [-] 
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Table 3 continued 
Company Metal Externalisation 
implication:  
(state)       
[change] 
Finance Externalisation 
implication:  
(state)     
[change] 
Diversification Wide and growing 
range of interests 
and activities 
(-) [- -] Focus on core 
activities, 
though may be 
redefined as in 
Gerbank, and 
extend to wider 
financial ser-
vices 
(+) [+/-] 
Internationalisa-
tion 
Increasing cross-
border business 
streams and inter-
nal investment 
markets. 
Bigger Anglo-
American presence 
in UK and Bel-
gium; national/ 
private ownership 
in Germany and  
Italy 
(-) 
 
[-] 
 
[- ]  
[-/+] 
Separate na-
tional structures 
for subsidiaries. 
National owner-
ship with private 
and institutional 
shareholdings 
important in It-
aly  
(+) [+] 
Performance Cost-cutting pres-
sures 
(-) [-] High profits. 
Can buy re-
structuring at 
company level 
(+/-) [-] 
Trade union 
strength 
High, but generally 
lower than in past. 
Unions remain 
principal bargain-
ing agents in large 
firms. 
(+) [-/+] Lower than 
metal. Works 
councils may 
not be closely 
union con-
trolled. 
(-) [-] 
Clear too is the role of external restructuring, in the shape of mergers, acquisi-
tions and divestments, in prompting large companies to attempt to re-shape not only 
the internal bargaining arena, but also the relationship between the internal and ex-
ternal arenas. As described earlier, the emphasis in banking on merger has resulted in 
centralisation of domestic collective bargaining arrangements in order to handle the 
consequences within a common framework. In contrast, the more pronounced ten-
390  James Arrowsmith, Paul Marginson, Keith Sisson Externalisation and Internalisation of Collective Bargaining 
dency amongst the metal companies  also evident amongst the banks - has been to-
wards acquisitions and divestments, the combination of which has led to shifts in fo-
cus and diversification of companies business portfolios. Internally, this has resulted 
in pressure for collective bargaining arrangements differentiated by business activity. 
Externally, it has reinforced pressures for greater flexibility in sector arrangements to 
reflect diverse business situations, and in the absence of reform in this direction, 
moves and threats to place new business activities outside of sector arrangements.  
4. Implications 
Our analysis of the changing balance of collective bargaining within and with-
out the firms develops a point made by Roche (2000) that, in terms of broad changes 
within industrial relations systems, contingency is the trend. The issue is not so much 
the passage from one regime of collective bargaining to another but the continually 
evolving nature of relationships at company and sector level, albeit within estab-
lished national frameworks. In analytical terms this points to the value of combining 
a bottom-up approach with a top-down one. Understandably, the national frame-
work is a key focus of analysis with differences in state traditions and national busi-
ness systems being especially important. Likewise, the existing structures of multi-
employer bargaining are very relevant, such as the degree of comprehensiveness and 
nature of the employees bargaining agent. It is a moot point, however, whether 
country should be accorded such analytically prior status over sector and company as 
has tended to be the case (Hollingsworth/Streeck 1994). Crucially, factors such as 
industrial structure, product market integration, sectoral and company industrial rela-
tions traditions and union organisation underpin variation from a bottom-up per-
spective. Hence, for example, the major differences observed in collective bargaining 
between Germetal and Gerbank, both within the firm and in relation to the multi-
employer arrangements, notwithstanding (or in a sense because of) the shared na-
tional framework. 
From the point of view of policy and practice, it is fair to say that the balance of 
advantage in terms of transaction costs and power factors is moving in favour of sin-
gle employer bargaining. The growing differentiation of activities between and 
within firms is a key element driving both sets of change. This does not necessarily 
herald the demise of multi-employer bargaining, however. The extent to which MEB 
arrangements remain entrenched is likely to be shaped by two considerations. One is 
the legal framework. Thus the incentive to remain involved in multi-employer bar-
gaining is particularly strong in Germany, where agreements impose a 'peace obliga-
tion' on trade unions; where there is an explicit division of responsibilities between 
trade unions and works councils; and where there is statutory provision for exten-
sion. In other countries, where the legal framework is not so supportive, the incentive 
is not as strong. Much therefore depends on management and trade union prefer-
ences, which is the second consideration. Here, if lessons drawn from UK experience 
are correct, the critical factor will be the extent to which trade unions continue to 
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seek to transfer the benefits won in the larger companies into the sector agreement. 
Equally important is that, if in the process they allow sector agreements to develop 
into wholly soft frameworks, they risk them becoming little more than empty shell. 
It will require a balancing act of some skill. 
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